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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State presented false testimony during the preliminary hearing, motion to
suppress hearing, and during trial. The State, thereafter, vouched for the credibility of a
law enforcement officer who presented false testimony during these hearings.
Mr. Wheeler asserts he was denied a fair trial and, therefore, the matter should be
remanded for a new trial. Additionally, the district court erred denying his motion to
suppress the evidence obtained through the forcible blood draw. This reply brief is
necessary to further elaborate on Mr. Wheeler's claims.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Wheeler's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1.

Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct by continuing to allow the
police officer to submit false testimony and then vouching for the trooper's
credibility in closing arguments?

2.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Wheeler's motion to suppress the results
of the forcible blood draw because it was unreasonable under the circumstances
and Mr. Wheeler revoked his implied consent?

ARGUMENT

The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct By Continuinq To Allow The
Police Officer To Submit False Testimony And Then Vouching For The Trooper's
Credibilitv In Closina Arquments
A.

Introduction
This Reply brief will respond to general areas in response to the State's

argument. First, that Mr. Wheeler's claim may be raised for the first time on appeal
because his claim is that the prosecutor's actions prevented obtaining a conviction by
criminal process that was fair.

Second, the vouching that occurred in this case

constituted misconduct and is prohibited under both federal and state law.
B.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims May Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal
The State argues that a prosecutor's presentation of knowing false testimony in

an attempt to seek a conviction may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 10-11.) The State bases its argument upon the premise
that a Napue claim may not be raised for the first time on appeal (Respondent's Brief,
pp.6-7) and vouching for the credibility of an officer during closing arguments is not
fundamental error (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-I I ) . Mr. Wheeler disagrees.
Mr. Wheeler asserts that he was deprived of a fair trial; he contends that the
prosecutor's actions of allowing Trooper Jayne to testify falsely deprived him of a fair
trial . He asserts that the prosecutor's actions of having him bound over with the use of
false testimony, using the false testimony to avoid suppression of evidence, continuing
with different false testimony at trial, and then vouching for the credibility of the officer

when the only material issue in dispute was the credibility over the testimony of whether
Mr. Wheeler drove his motorcycle on a public highway, all deprived him of process that
was fundamentally fair.
Prosecutorial misconduct as occurred in this case need not first be presented to
the district court. A prosecutorial misconduct claim is not a basis for a motion for a new
trial.

See State v. Page, 135 ldaho 214, 223, 16 P.3d 890, 899 (2000). In State v.

Irwin, the ldaho Supreme Court vacated a judgment based upon the prosecutor's
inappropriate line of questioning. See Irwin, 9 ldaho 35, 71 P. 608 (1903). The concept
that the prosecutor may act inappropriately outside of the disputed evidence was more
recently recognized in State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App.
2007).

In Phillips, the Court of Appeals noted that the prosecutor may not use

inappropriate comments about defense counsel and such use constitutes prosecutorial
misconduct. Id. Nor may a prosecutor use inflammatory words about a witness or the
defendant is inappropriate. Id. A prosecutor may not mischaracterize the evidence in
closing arguments. Id. Nor may the prosecutor misrepresent the law. Id. Moreover,
the prosecutor may not present the case to appeal to the emotion, passion or prejudice
of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics. Id. The prohibited conduct outlined in
Phillips does not necessary go to certain evidence that is at issue in the case, but
instead recognizes the limited boundaries by the manner by which the prosecutor may
gain a conviction. Id.
Thus, the only time that direct review of whether the actions of the prosecutor
deprived a person of a fundamentally fair trial is by raising the issue on direct appeal. If
this Court never reviews the manner by which convictions are obtained, prosecutor's

actions will go unchecked and defendants will be convicted by ldaho proceedings that
were unjust and fundamentally unfair. For policy reasons this Court should review the
process for fundamental fairness.
Mr. Wheeler argues that the manner by which this prosecutor obtained the
conviction - by use of the known false testimony and vouching for the credibility of the
officer

- deprived him of a fair trial.

Mr. Wheeler asserts his case is akin to a case

where the prosecutor has been ordered to not present certain pieces of evidence and
does so in spite of the court's order, or asks inappropriate questions. The prosecutor's
actions are as egregious as a defense attorney encouraging the defendant to present
perjured testimony.

The process by which this conviction was obtained was

fundamentally unfair
C.

The Closina Ar~umentsIn This Case Constituted Misconduct
The State asserts that Mr. Wheeler failed to explain how the closing arguments

constituted inappropriate vouching (Respondent's Brief, p.12) and failed to discuss
vouching under ldaho case law (Respondent's Brief, p.12, n.4). Mr. Wheeler asserts
that a Ninth Circuit case best explained why the comments made by the prosecutor in
this case were inappropriate vouching and that ldaho case law also supports finding
vouching to be fundamental error.
Whether Mr. Wheeler drove on the public highway was the critical issue of the
case.

The jurors would either believe Trooper Jayne who claimed that he saw

Mr. Wheeler drive on the highway, although his video would not depict his version of the
events, or the jurors would believe Mr. Wheeler who claimed to have pushed his bike
across the public highway and then drove the bike on the private property. The

prosecutor used the cloak of the government seal to vouch for the credibility of the
officer by explaining to the jurors that the officer would not jeopardize his job over this
case and, therefore, would not lie about he observed.
The Ninth Circuit case, United States

v. Edwards,

154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir.

1998), recognized that different types of vouching exists. The type that occurred in this
case is more akin to the first type described in Edwards; the prosecutor places the
prestige of the government behind the witness. Id. The Edwards Court recognized that
not all vouching would render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair, but would more likely
do so in those cases when the credibility of a key witness is crucial. Id. Moreover, the
Court recognized that the rule against vouching was designed to prevent prosecutors
from taking advantage of the natural tendency of jury members to believe in the honesty
of the government lawyers. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that enforcement of the rule
against vouching implicates the basic foundation of our system of justice. Id., (quoting,
United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985).) The Edwards Court went
on to evaluate whether the improper vouching amounted to harmless error, concluding
that although the prosecutor acted in good faith and acted in an ethical manner at all
times, nevertheless, the prosecutor's personal involvement in discovery of the crucial
piece of evidence, his vouching for the credibility of a particular witness, and acting as a
silent witness throughout the trial, did not constitute harmless error.
The obligation of the state to see that defendants receive a fair trial is primary
and fundamental. Pulver v. Sfafe, 93 Idaho 687, 471 P.2d 74 (1970) (quoting
Mclnfosh v. Commonwealth,

Ky.,368 S.W.2d 331

(Ky.Ct.App.1963)). The State may

only obtain a valid conviction in a fundamentally fair manner. Schwartzmiller v. Winters,

99 ldaho 18, 19, 576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). In State v. Perry, the ldaho Supreme
Court recognized that "the jury's vital and exclusive function [is] to make credibility
determinations . . . ." Perry, 139 ldaho 520, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003) (prohibiting the use of
polygraph results at the jury trial stage because it usurps the jury's function). ldaho
recognizes a prosecutor's personal opinion or belief about a witness' credibility is
inappropriate during closing arguments. Sfate v. Timrnons, 145 ldaho 279, 288, 178
P.3d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 2007).
[However, a] prosecuting attorney may express an opinion in argument as
to the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such
opinion is based upon the evidence, but the prosecutor should exercise
caution to avoid interjecting his or her personal belief and should explicitly
state that the opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence
presented at trial.
State v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 19, 189 P.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 2008). When the
prosecutor expresses personal opinion or implies that he may be privy to additional
information, unknown to the jury, tending to corroborate the witnesses testimony,
misconduct occurs. See State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 24, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App.

The prosecutor in this case either knew or should have known from the prior
hearings, that he was dealing with an officer who lied under oath. By asking the jury if
they heard anything about the officer lying only attempted to vouch for the officer's
testimony; this prosecutor must have known that Trooper Jayne had not testified
honestly in this case. After trying to convince the jury that this officer would not lie, the
prosecutor argued that this officer would not risk his career over obtaining a conviction
in this case. The career comment implies privy to information unbeknownst to the jury
and indicates that this officer would never testify inappropriately. While this case does

involve an officer who has lied about certain evidence, the prosecutor was not simply
commenting on the evidence presented or asking the jurors to weigh the credibility for
themselves, but instead wraps the cloak of honesty of the government around this
officer. The prosecutor's closing arguments were merely the climax of prosecutorial
misconduct committed throughout Mr. Wheeler's criminal proceedings.

The District Court Erred In Denyinn Mr. Wheeler's Motion To Suooress The Results Of
The Forcible Blood Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The Circumstances And
Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied Consent
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wheeler asserts that the district court erred denying his suppression motion

because he revoked his implied consent. Mr. Wheeler requests that Stafe v. Diaz, 144
Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007), be modified to comport with this Court's own
precedent and that of the United States Supreme Court.

6.

The Fourth Amendment Protects Individuals From Unreasonable Forcible Blood

Draws

Neither this Court, through broad interpretation, nor the State through legislative
enactments, can reduce or rescind the minimal, basic, and fundamental protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens, irrespective of their
domicile, by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Ybarra v.

Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979) (state statute which purports to authorize police in
some circumstances to make searches and seizures without probable cause and
without search warrants falls within the category of statutes "purporting to authorize

searches without probable cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as
authority for unconstitutional searches.").
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people, not
places, from unwarranted governmental intrusions. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96
n.5 (1990); State v. Pruss, 145 ldaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008) (emphasis
added). Fourth Amendment protections are secured by the constitutional requirement
that all searches and seizures be reasonable. Warrantless searches and seizures are
per se unreasonable unless they fall within a specifically established and welldelineated exception to the warrant requirement. Califon7ia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
580 (1991); Sfate v. Murphy, 129 ldaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997).
When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a heavy burden to
justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
749-750 (1984); State v. Curl, 125 ldaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993).
It is without question that "[tlhe taking of a blood alcohol content test is a seizure
within the context of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution." Sfate v.
Woolery, 116 ldaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989) (citations omitted) As the
United States Supreme Court recognized in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767

It could not reasonably be argued, and indeed respondent does not argue,
that the administration of the blood test in this case was free of the
constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly
constitute searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures
of 'persons,' within the meaning of that Amendment.
384 U.S. at 767.

C.

The United States Supreme Court Historical Develo~mentOf The Limited
Forcible Blood Draw
Schmerber was only the second case to be considered by the United States

Supreme Court on the question of whether forcible blood draws violate an individual's
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, but it was
also the last. In the first case, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439-440 (1957), the
petitioner was driving a truck that collided with a passenger car, killing all three
occupants of the car and seriously injuring the petitioner. Id. at 433. Officers found a
nearly empty whiskey bottle in the glove compartment of the petitioner's truck, and the
smell of alcohol was detected on the petitioner's breath at the hospital. Id.

The

petitioner's blood was drawn by a physician, at the request of a police officer, while the
petitioner was unconscious and results revealed the petitioner's blood alcohol content to
be .17. Id. The petitioner challenged the admission of the blood test results at his trial,
arguing the blood draw was involuntary and violated his Due Process rights. Id. The
United States Supreme Court held that blood test results were admissible in the
petitioner's involuntary manslaughter prosecution because New Mexico had validly
declined to adopt the exclusionary Rule for Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 439440. In determining that the blood draw was not offensive to due process, the Court
emphasized the fact that the blood was drawn under the protective eye of the physician,
and not done in a manner that would shock the conscience or be considered a method
of obtaining evidence that would offend a sense of justice. Id. at 438.
Subsequently, the Court directly addressed the blood draw as a Fourth
Amendment issue. In Schmerber, the petitioner and a companion had been drinking at
a bar at a bowling alley. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. After the pair left the bowling alley, the car

which the petitioner was driving skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree. Id. Both
the petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to the hospital for treatment.'

Id. At the hospital, a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample from the
petitioner. Id. at 758. The results revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in the
petitioner's blood, which indicated intoxication, and such results were admitted at
petitioner's trial. Id. at 759. The petitioner objected to the admission of the results,
arguing that his blood was drawn despite his refusal to consent to the test. Id.
The Schrnerber Court found no violation stemming from the warrantless taking of
the petitioner's blood under the unique facts of the case. Specifically, the Court relied on
the destruction of blood evidence as a relevant factor in the exigency determination
under the following circumstances: the officer investigating the accident encountered
the defendant at the accident scene; the defendant smelled of alcohol; the passenger in
defendant's car was injured and taken to the hospital; the investigating officer arrived at
the hospital where defendant was being treated almost two hours after the accident;
and finally, the defendant was placed under arrest. The Schrnerber Court, without citing
to any authority, stated:
We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as fhe body funcfions to
eliminafe it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where
time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and
secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt
to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an
appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest.

' While this incident was charged as misdemeanor driving under the influence of

alcohol, it should be noted that the offense occurred in 1964 and there is no indication
that state law, at the time, included a more serious offense of causing an accident or
injury while DUI. Of course, the underlying facts of the offense in Schmerber are more
serious than a simple misdemeanor DUI.

Id. at 771 (emphasis added).*
Before broadly applying the analysis of Schmerber to any other case or facts,
however, it is important to remember the Court's final admonition:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on
the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is
a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution
does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Id. (emphasis added).

D.

Idaho's Struqale To Limit The Scope Of The Forcible Blood Draw
Since Schmerber was issued in 1966, ldaho courts have struggled to identify

limits on the scope of forcible evidentiary testing in D.U.I. prosecutions and driver
license suspension hearings. The ldaho Supreme appears to have first addressed the
ability of an individual to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration
in the context of driver's license revocation matter. See State v. Ankney, I 0 9 ldaho 1,
704 P.2d 333 (1985). In Ankney, the defendant argued that he had shown cause for
refusing to take the evidentiary test when he testified that he did not know whether he
had a constitutional right to refuse the test and he did not understand the refusal form

It is important to remember that Schmerber was decided in 1966. More than 35
years have passed since the decision, and technology in the scientific and medical
fields has advanced exponentially. While the court in 1966 may have been justified in
relying upon the destruction of blood evidence as a factor in the exigent circumstance
analysis excusing the warrant requirement, the state of technology, advancements in
medical and scientific technology over the past 35 years vitiate the propriety of such a
strenuous reliance.

that was read to him. Id. at 3, 704 P.2d at 335. As a result, the defendant argued that
his driver's license should not have been suspended because of his refusal to submit to
an evidentiary test. The ldaho Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that "[ulnder
Ankney's reading of the statute, any justification for not taking the test would be
sufficient to excuse a person from the test. This interpretation is contrary to both good
sense and the rules of statutory construction." Id. at 6 , 704 P.2d at 338.
A few months later, in Sfafe v. Tierney, I09 ldaho 474, 708 P.2d 879 (1985), the
ldaho Supreme Court again considered the right to refuse evidentiary testing for alcohol
in the context of a driver's license suspension. In Tierney, the defendant refused to
submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration and a result, his driver's license
was seized and suspended. Id. at 476, 708 P.2d at 881. The defendant challenged his
license suspension, and the court held a hearing at which the defendant testified that he
declined the test because (1) he was intoxicated, and (2) he was on medications he
believed might affect the outcome of the test. Id. The defendant's testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend and an acquaintance. Id. at 447, 708
P.2d at 882. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the defendant's
"justifications for refusing to submit to the test do not constitute 'cause' for refusal to
submit to the test." Id. (citing Ankney, 109 ldaho at 1, 704 P.2d at 333).
The ldaho Supreme Court next considered the ability of an individual to refuse to
submit to a blood-alcohol test, again in the civil context, in In re Grififhs, 113 ldaho 364,

744 P.2d 92 (1987). In GriiTfhs, the defendant's driver's license was suspended based
on his refusal to take a test to determine his blood alcohol content. Id. at 365, 744 P.2d
at 93. The defendant appealed the suspension to the magistrate court, which held a

hearing and considered testimony from police officers, including the arresting officer, the
defendant, and the defendant's mother. Id. at 366-367, 744 P.2d at 94-95.

The

defendant and his mother both testified that he had a fear of needles, and the defendant
testified that was the reason he refused to submit to the blood draw. Id. The magistrate
found that fear of needles was not, as a matter of law, reason to refuse a blood-alcohol
test. Id. at 367, 744 P.2d at 95. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that" a fear of
needles may establish sufficient cause for refusing to submit to a blood test requested
pursuant to I.C. §18-8002 if the fear is of such a magnitude that as a practical matter the
defendant is psychologically unable to submit to the test, and if the fear is sufficiently
articulated to the police officer at the time of the refusal so that the officer is given an
opportunity to request a different test." Id. at 372, 744 P.2d at 100. Notably, the
Griffiths Court acknowledged that the language of I.C. § 18-8002(3), formerly codified

as I.C. §49-352, which allowed a defendant to show cause why he or she refused an
evidentiary test, "had meaning in and of itself, and by itself established grounds for
refusal." Id. The Court further noted that "[ilt seems self-evident that the legislature has
authorized the seizure of a license only where the defendant has refused a requested
test after being properly informed." Id. In sum, the Griffiths Court recognized the ability
of a driver to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol content.
It was not until 1989 that the Court addressed a defendant's ability to refuse to
submit to evidentiary testing for blood alcohol content in the criminal context.

See

State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989). In Woolery, the defendant was
driving a truck at a high rate of speed through an intersection and failed to stop at the
stop sign. Id. The defendant's vehicle crashed into the victim's car, killing the victim's

passenger and seriously injuring the victim. Id. The defendant suffered head and chest
injuries and was transported to Mercy Medical Center for treatment. Id. at 369, 775 P.2d
at 1211. An officer at the scene followed the ambulance to Mercy Medical Center and
told the defendant's treating physician that he needed a blood test sample from the
defendant. Id. The sample was drawn and revealed that the defendant's blood alcohol
content was over the legal limit. Id. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the
test results, arguing that he did not consent to the blood test. Id. at 370, 775 P.2d at

At a hearing, the State stipulated that the defendant was not provided with the
advisory rights contained in I.C. $18-8002 when his blood was drawn, and the testimony
of the officer established the defendant was not under arrest at the time of the blood
draw. Id. The lower court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that: "[iln the instant situation, the destruction of
the evidence by metabolism of alcohol in the blood provides an inherent exigency which
justifies the warrantless search." Id. As a result, the Court concluded that the relevant
questions were whether there was sufficient justification for ordering the testing, and
whether the test was conducted in a reasonable manner. Id. at 371,775 P.2d at 1213.
The legislature acknowledged [in I.C. 3 18-80021 that some individuals
refuse to comply with their previously granted [implied] consent to submit
to an evidentiary test. Rather than condone a physical conflict, the
legislature provided for the administrative revocation of the license
of an individual who refuses to comply with his previously given
consent. Such legislative acknowledgement was not meant to hamstring
the ability of law enforcement to properly investigate and obtain evidence
of serious crimes committed by those individuals who have chosen
to drink and drive.

For the driver who has been involved in an accident which causes either
serious injury or death, the state must have the usual authority to
investiaate and collect evidence which exists in anv other felonv
investiiation. Thus, a driver's refusal to peacefully*submit to ah
evidentiary test should not preclude law enforcement from making
-a
probable cause seizure of his blood.
Id. at 373-374, 775 P.2d at 1215-1216 (emphasis added).

In State v. McCormack, 117 ldaho 1009, 793 P.2d 682 (1990), the ldaho
Supreme Court considered a challenge to applicability of I.C. §18-8002 on Indian
reservations. In considering the jurisdictional issue, the Court also considered whether
the breath alcohol tests were admissible against the defendants. The defendants had
voluntarily submitted to the tests after being advised that the failure to do so would
result in a 180 day driver's license suspension. Id. at 1010, 793. P.2d at 683. In
addressing the implied consent provision, the Court noted that "[allthough under
I.C. §18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary
test, that section did not create statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent
or refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level." Id. at
1013-1014, 793 P.2d at 686-687 (citing Woole~y,116 ldaho at 368, 775 P.2d at 1210).
Subsequent cases addressing refusals to submit to evidentiary testing for blood
alcohol content arose in the context of simple driving under the influence of alcohol
charges not involving accidents, or in license revocation proceedings.

See, e.g.,

State v. Nickerson, 132 ldaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1999) (defendant charged
with DUI first refused and then consented to breath test only after being ordered to do
so by his parole officer; consent was not involuntary and results were admissible
because the defendant had impliedly consented to such testing by driving a car on
ldaho highways, and "although an individual has the physical ability to prevent a test,

there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent."); State v. Halen, 136
ldaho 829, 41 P.3d 257 (2002) (affirming driver's license suspension based on driver's
refusal to submit to blood draw based on dislike for needles, where driver's dislike of
needles did not constitute a "psychological inability to submit to the [blood] test" and did
demonstrate cause for refusing test); Sfafe V. Worthington, 138 ldaho 470, 65 P.3d 211
(Ct. App. 2002) (warrantless forcible blood draw of defendant charged with felony DUI,
where three officers and two nurses held defendant down, and physical restraints were
used to accomplish forcible blood draw, not violative of Fourth Amendment due to
exigent circumstances or implied consent, and draw not unreasonable).

E.

Idaho's Abandonment Of Its Own Standards And Those Identified Bv The United
States Constitution And United States Supreme Court And Renderincr Portions
Of The Implied Consent Statute Superfluous
Despite the clear constitutional standards adopted by the ldaho Supreme Court

in Grififhs and Woolery, which were based on Schmerber and grounded in the Fourth
Amendment, the ldaho Supreme Court recently abandoned those standards in Sfafe v.
Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). In Diaz, the defendant was suspected of
driving under the influence of alcohol and was transported by the officer to a local
hospital where his blood was drawn. Id. at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. The defendant did
not physically resist either being transported to the hospital, or the taking of his blood,
but protested the blood draw. Id. The Defendant was ultimately charged with felony
DUI based on prior convictions, and he sought to suppress his blood test results,
arguing that the test was involuntatary and not justified by exigent circumstances. Id.
The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the blood draw could be
justified either by exigent circumstances or consent. Id. Diaz, 144 ldaho at 302, 160

P.3d at 471. Because the defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary
testing by driving on an ldaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." Id. at
303, 160 P.3d at 742.

Given the Court's finding that the forcible blood draw was

consensual, the Court went on to consider the reasonableness of the blood draw under
the Fourth Amendment, in light of the totality of the circumstances including:

(1)

whether the procedure was done in a medically acceptable manner; and (2) whether the
procedure was done without unreasonable force. Id.

Finding the blood draw to be

reasonable, the Court then considered whether I.C. $18-8002(6)(b) permits officers to
order involuntary blood draws absent offenses such as aggravated DUI or vehicular
manslaughter. The Court found that the statute provides NO protection to drivers, but
only to hospital professionals, and does nothing more than limit when an officer may
request, rather than order, hospital personnel to draw a driver's blood against the
driver's will. Id. at 303-304, 160 P.3d at 742-743.
The Court's decision in Diaz is contrary to Schmerber, its own precedent (see
Grimihs; Woolery), and it renders portions of ldaho Code irrelevant and superfluous. It is
not disputed that in ldaho, as is true in every other state, by driving a motor vehicle on
the roadways (or in some jurisdictions, by obtaining a driver's license), a driver consents
to evidentiary testing of his or her blood, breath and urine for the presence of alcohol or
intoxicating substances, when an officer has reasonable grounds, or probable cause, to
believe the driver is DUI. See ldaho Code §§ 18-8002(1), -8002A(e); M. Elizabeth
Fuller, Comment, Implied Consenf Statutes: What is Refusal?, 9 AM. J. OF TRIALADVOC.
423,424 FN.12 (1986) (identifying and citing to implied consent statutes in every state).

In exchange for the privilege of driving on the roadways of a given state, or in
exchange for the privilege of a driver's license, a driver impliedly consents to submit to
evidentiary testing so long as that testing is legally justified. Id. Despite the existence of
implied consent laws, the vast majority of states have nevertheless found that an
individual may refuse to submit to evidentiary testing, so long as they are advised that
the failure to submit to testing will result in a civil penalty and driver's license
suspension. See, e.g., Pena, v. State, 684 P.2d 864 (Alaska 1984) (chemical sobriety
test results inadmissible in manslaughter prosecution of defendant who refused to take
test); State v. Estrada, 100 P.3d 452 (Ariz. Ct. Ap. Div. 2 2004) (blood test results in DUI
prosecution inadmissible when blood drawn without warrant while defendant received
medical treatment against his will); State v. Slaney, 653 So.2d 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Appl.
3d Dist. 1995) (blood test results inadmissible in DUI prosecution where driver
consented to blood draw only after being misinformed by officer that statute required
him to submit to test, rather than telling driver that driver could submit to test);
Pilkenton v. State, 561 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (in DUI prosecution, evidence
insufficient to invoke implied consent statute allowing officers to require driver to submit
to blood test where there is an accident involving serious injury, where driver
complained of pain in wrist and other driver was bleeding but not seriously injured);
Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (implied consent laws could not
be applied in DUI causing death where officer requesting medical personnel to draw
defendant's blood did not advise defendant of implied consent law and did not seek
defendant's actual consent); People v. Wade, 460 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. 1983) (under
implied consent law if officer has reasonable grounds to believe driver is DUI, officer

may have a blood sample withdrawn by appropriate professional within two hours of
arrest for results to be admissible but officer MUST honor conscious suspect's wish to
refuse test); State

V.

Shantie, 92 P.3d 746 (Ore. 2004) (defendant's refusal to consent

to blood draw did not render blood draw results inadmissible in DUI trial under implied
consent law where the evidence was obtained pursuant to a warrant); State v. Mullins,
489 S.E. 2d 923 (S.C. 1997) (under implied consent statute, once driver refused blood
tests, no chemical tests could be performed and results were inadmissible in DUI trial);
Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (implied consent statute did
not preclude taking of blood sample pursuant to search warrant and thus results were
admissible in DUI prosecution even where driver did not consent; implied consent
statute did not provide greater protection than fourth amendment).
Indeed, both ldaho Code and case law recognize that individuals will refuse to
submit to evidentiary testing. See ldaho Code $18-8002(3) ("At the time evidentiary
testing . . . is requested, the person shall be informed that if he refuses to submit to or if
he fails to complete, evidentiary testing . . . .") I.C. $18-8002(4) ("If the motorist refuses
to submit to or complete evidentiary testing.

. . . "); I.C. $18-8002A(2) ("At the time of

evidentiary testing . . . is requested, the person shall be informed that if the person
refuses to submit to or fails to complete evidentiary testing

....

I . $18-8004(2)

("Any person who does not take a test to determine alcohol concentration or whose test
result is determined by the court to be unreliable or inadmissible against him

. . . .");

Griffifhs, 1I 3 ldaho at 370, 744 P.2d at 98.; buf see State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 302303, 160 P.3d 739, 741-742 (2007) (holding that pursuant to I.C. $18-8002(1), by
driving a vehicle, the defendant impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for alcohol

and could not withdraw that consent); Halen v. State, 136 ldaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257,
261 (2002) (same in the context of a driver's license suspension challenge where
defendant refused and did not submit to an alcohol concentration test); State v.
Worfhingfon, 138 ldaho 470, 475, 65 P.3d 211, 216 (Ct. App 2002) ("[The defendant],
by virtue of the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement and Idaho's
implied consent statute, had no legal entitlement to refuse or prevent the blood draw.").
The only circumstances under which an officer is permitted to require a driver,
against his or her will, to submit to evidentiary testing is when the officer has probable
cause to believe the driver has committed one of the following offenses: (1) aggravated
DUI; (2) vehicular manslaughter where the driver is under the influence; (3) aggravated

operation of a vessel on the waters of ldaho while the operator is under the influence;
and (4) criminal homicide involving a vessel on the waters of ldaho while the operator is
under the influence. See ldaho Code § 18-8002(6)(b); buf see Diaz, 144 ldaho at 303304, 160 P.3d at 742-743 (holding that I.C. §18-8002(6)(b) applies and protects medical
personnel only, and limits when an officer may order medical personnel to administer a
blood withdrawal, not when an officer can requesf a blood draw). An officer is permitted
to compel evidentiary testing under these enumerated circumstances just as he or she
would be able to do in any other serious felony case. Where an officer has probable
cause to believe that one of these "serious crimes [has been] committed by those
individuals who have chosen to drink and drive[,]"and the driver has "been involved

in an accident which causes either serious injury or death, the state must have the usual
authority to investigate and collect evidence which exists in any other felony
investigation." Woolery, I16 ldaho at Id. at 373-374, 775 P.2d at 1215-1216 (emphasis

added). Thus, the ability of an officer to obtain a blood sample without the express
consent of a driver, and indeed in the face of the withdrawal of any implied consent, is
not contingent on the implied consent statute, but rather, hinges on traditional notions of
probable cause and warrant exceptions.
F.

The Distinction Between Consent and Exiaent Circumstances
The Diaz Court was simply incorrect in concluding that forcing a defendant to

submit to a blood draw over his objection could be justified by reliance on the implied
consent law. Diaz, 144 ldaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 471. It is not true that because the
defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving on an ldaho
road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." Id. at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. In
reaching its conclusions, the Diaz Court makes the fundamental mistake of conflating
the concepts of exigent circumstances and consent.
When a warrantless search is justified on the basis of exigent circumstances, the
search must also be justified by probable cause. State v. Holton, 132 ldaho 501, 504,
975 P.2d 789, 792 (1999) ("The exigent circumstances exception refers broadly to fact
patterns sufficient to excuse an officer form the requirement of obtaining a warrant to
conduct a search for which he has probable cause." (citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted)). An exigent circumstance is one in which "the facts known at the
time of the [warrantless] entry indicate a 'compelling need for official action and no time
to secure a warrant."13 State v. Smith, 144 ldaho 482, 485-486, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197-

The availability of the telephonic warrant is certainly a factor that must be considered
in determining whether the circumstances are exigent, i.e., whether officers have time to
secure a warrant. See, e.g., Stafe v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 778-780 (Utah 2007).
See United Sfates v. Baker, 520 F.Supp. 1080, 1083 (D.lowa 1981) (finding that one

1198 (2007) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)). The scope of a
warrantless entry or search premised on probable cause and exigent circumstances is
limited by the exigency that justified the warrantless entry or search at the outset. Id. at
487, 163 P.3d at 1199 (citations omitted). The dissipation of blood alcohol is not
sufficient in and of itself to constitute exigent

circumstance^.^ See, e.g., Sfate v.

Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007).
In contrast, consent is an exception to the probable cause requirement, and thus
an exception to the warrant requirement. Schnecklofh v. Bustamonfe, 412 U.S. 218
(1973).

An officer need not possess probable cause, reasonable suspension, or

anything more than a hunch before asking a citizen whether he or she will consent to

hour and fifteen minutes was "abundant time" to obtain warrant by telephone, a process
that often takes no more than thirty minutes); Sfate v. Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127, 131
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) ("[Tlhe Mesa Police Department is able to obtain a warrant within
as little as fifteen minutes and that delays of only fifteen to forty-five minutes are
commonplace."). "The mere possibility of delay does not give rise to an exigency."
Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 131.
The dissipation of alcohol from the human body is accomplished at somewhere
between the rate of .015% and.018% per hour; although in some individuals the rate
AN INTRODUCTION
may be as high as .022%. See RICHARDSAFERSTEIN,CRIMJNALISTICS:
TO FORENSIC
SCIENCE280 (5th ed. 1995). Following the drawing of a blood sample, any
subsequent testing will reflect the blood alcohol content level at the time of the blood
draw, but not the level at the time of operation of a motor vehicle. See DAVIDR. HARPER
& JANETE.L. CORRY,COLLECTION
AND STORAGE
OF SPECIMENS
FOR ALCOHOL
ANALYSIS,
IN
MEDICOLEGAL
ASPECTSOF ALCOHOLDETERMINATION
IN BIOLOGICAL
SPECIMENS145, 149
(James C. Garriott ed. 1993). Fairly simple scientific formulae, known as retrograde
extrapolation, are employed to convert blood alcohol content results from the time of the
blood draw to the time of actual physical control over a motor vehicle. LAWRENCE
TAYLOR,DRUNKDRIVINGDEFENSE§ 8.01 (4th ed. 1996). According even to conservative
estimates, given our knowledge of alcohol dissipation, there exists at least a 3.6 hour
window of opportunity during which a search warrant can be obtained to obtain a blood
sample for forensic testing without affecting the integrity of blood alcohol content results.
Id. § 6.02; see also 49 C.F.R. § 382.209 (1995) (Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations prohibit drivers who may be required to take a post-accident alcohol test
from consuming any alcohol for eight hours after an accident, or until the test is
conducted, whichever is sooner.).

search of their person or property. Of course, an individual always has the right to say
no. To be valid, consent must be given voluntarily. Smith, 144 Idaho at 488, 163 P.3d
at 1200. Voluntariness is "a question of fact to be determined in light of all the
surrounding circumstances." Id. In addition, if a person consents to a search, the
scope of the consensual "search is generally defined by its expressed object[,]" or by
limits placed upon the scope of the search by the consenting party. Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248,251 (1991) ("A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of
the search to which he consents.").
In addition to being limited, consent may also be withdrawn. United States v.
McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (gth Cir. 2006) (holding that, "a suspect is free . . . after
initially giving consent, to delimit or withdraw his or her consent at anytime," in the
context of a stop and risk); United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2005)
("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); United States v. Lockett, 406
F.3d 907 (3'* Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the right to revoke his
consent, in the context of a luggage search); United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 281
1

C r 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United States v. Bustillos-

Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (loth Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a vehicle search); United
States

V.

McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1993) (same, in the context of a luggage

search). Thus, the scope of a consensual search under the Fourth Amendment is
determined by standards of

objective reasonableness: "what would the typical

reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?" Id.

Where the State seeks to rely upon voluntary implied consent to support forced
blood draws under the Fourth Amendment, the State bears the burden not only that the
consent was voluntary, but that the search conducted falls within the parameters or
limits of the consent given. Thereafter, assuming the implied consent was voluntary
and the search was limited to the scope of the consent given, and not otherwise
withdrawn, the State must further demonstrate the search was reasonable. Jimeno,
500 U.S. at 250 ("The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."); Diaz,
144 Idaho at 303,160 P.3d at 742
G.

The State Mav Not Grant A Privileae On A Renunciation Of A Constitutional
Riaht To Due Process
Moreover, it is without question that a State cannot condition the granting of a

privilege upon the renunciation of a constitutional right to due process. See
Slochower v. Bd. Of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956) (striking down statute
which made the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by a city employee
or agent relating to his or official duties the functional equivalent of a resignation, where
statute resulted in conclusive presumption of guilt of one who claimed his or her
constitutional privilege, such discharge violated due process even though employee had
no constitutional right to be a City employee).
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the
citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an
act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a
surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state
threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the
proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a
privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to
impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one
of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the

relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in
like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence.
Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583, 593-594 (1926).
Here, the statute purporting to authorize warrantless, forcible blood draws based
on implied consent granted by the driver in exchange for the privilege of driving on
Idaho's roadways, and this Court's interpretation to the same effect, are precisely the
type of compulsion rejected by the United States Supreme Court. "If the State may
compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like
manner compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the
Constitution of the United States may be manipulated out of existence." Id. Compelled
consent to warrantless searches of one's body as a condition of driving a car is a
violation of due process and cannot be countenanced
Moreover a forcible blood draw like the one conducted here violates due process
because it involves the State obtaining evidence from an individual by violating an
individual's most cherished right to autonomy and privacy in his or her own skin. It does
so in a nonconsensual, forcible manner that offends not only a sense of justice, but
which "shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173 (1952).
"So here, to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the
court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing
would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a
society." Id. at 174.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wheeler respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Judgment of
Conviction and reverse this case for a new trial.
DATED this 24thday of September, 2009.
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